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N/A: Recent Decisions

RECENT DECISIONS
Labor Relations-LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Aar
oF 1959-ArroREY ENGAGED IN ANY AriTVrTY REPORTABLE UNDER SECTION 203(b) MUST ANNUALLY REPORT RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FROM

ALL LABOR RELATIONS ADVICE OR SERvics.-Pursuant to agreements with

three employers appellee, an attorney, spoke to assembled employees of each
of the three employers on the subject of a pending NLRB representation
election, thus bringing himself within the provisions' of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.2 Upon demand of the Secretary
of Labor that he comply with the reporting requirements of sections 203(b)8
and (c) 4 of the LMRDA, appellee filed a thirty day report setting forth the
1 For the purposes of the immediate action, the parties agreed that the speech-making
agreements and arrangements, and the activities undertaken pursuant to them, were reportable under § 203(b). See Douglas v. Wirtz, 232 F. Supp. 348, 350 (M.D.N.C. 1964). For
a detailed description of the stipulated facts, see Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-7, Douglas v.
Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964). For an analysis of the reporting requirements of the Act
see SYMPOSiuM ON LMRDA 369-440 (Slovenko ed. 1961); Aaron, The Labor-Management
Reporting And Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 851, 877-894 (1960); Bealrd, Reporting Requirements For Employers and Labor Relations Consultants in the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 53 GEo. L.J. 267 (1965); Segal, An
Analysis for Lawyers: The New Federal Labor Statute, 46 A.B.A.J. 31, 34 (1960); Smith,
The Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46 VA. L. REV. 195, 210-221
(1960); The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959: A Symposium, 54
Nw. U.L. REV. 659, 782-802 (1960). The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 will hereinafter be referred to as LMRDA.
8 29 U.S.C. § 433(b) (1964). The reporting obligations of this section apply to:
Every person who pursuant to any agreement or arrangement with an employer
undertakes activities where an object thereof is, directly or indirectly(1) to persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or to persuade employees as
to the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing; or
(2) to supply an employer with information concerning the activities of employees or
a labor organization in connection with a labor dispute involving such employer,
except information for use solely in conjunction with an administrative or arbitral
proceeding or a criminal or civil judicial proceeding; . . . .
Ibid.
4 29 U.S.C. § 433(c) (1964). This section exempts certain activities from the reporting
requirements:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any employer or other person
to file a report covering the services of such person by reason of his giving or agreeing
to give advice to such employer or representing or agreeing to represent such employer
before any court, administrative agency, or tribunal of arbitration or engaging or
agreeing to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of such employer with respect
to wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment or the negotiation of
an agreement or any question arising thereunder.
Ibid.
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terms of the agreements and filed annual reports0 in which he gave informadon concerning receipts and disbursements relating to his activities for the
three employers. However, he gave no information relating to his labor
relations services for other employers. 7 The Secretary of Labor demanded
that appellee amend his annual reports by adding all receipts and disburse-

ments from his entire labor law practice for the three years. 8 Appellee
brought action for a declaratory judgment9 construing his obligations under
5 29 U.S.C. § 433(b) (1964). This section provides in relevant part that a person undertaking certain enumerated activities:
[Slhall file within thirty days after entering into such agreement or arrangement a
report with the Secretary, signed by its president and treasurer or corresponding
principal officers, containing the name under which such person is engaged in doing
business and the address of its principal office, and a detailed statement of the te=s
and conditions of such agreement or arrangement ....
Ibid. This report is now Form LM-20, Agreement and Activities ReporL 29 C.F.R, § 4062
(1963). For a copy of Form LM-20 and detailed instructions for its preparation ee CCH
LAB. L REP.
7460 (1963).
' 29 U.S.C. § 433(b) (1964). This section provides in relevant part that a person engaging
in certain enumerated activities:
[S]hall file annually, with respect to each fiscal year during which payments were
made as a result of such an agreement or arrangement, a report with the Secretary,
signed by its president and treasurer or corresponding principal officers, containing
a statement (A) of its receipts of any kind from employers on account of labor relations
advice or services, designating the sources thereof, and (B) of its disbursements of
any kind, in connection with such services and the purposes thereof. In each such
case suck information shall be set forth in such categories as the Secretary may
prescribe.
Ibid. This report is now Form LM-21, Receipts and Disbursements Report. 29 C.F.R.
§ 406.3 (1963). For a copy of Form LM-21 and detailed instructions for its preparation
see CCH LAB. L REP. 7461 (1963).
7 During 1960, 1961, and 1962 appellee engaged in numerous other activities, and in
connection with them gave labor relations advice or services to other employers for which
he received fees and made some disbursements. See Brief of Appellant, p. 6, Douglas v.
Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965).
8 29 U.S.C. § 440 (1964). This section grants jurisdiction and provides for enforcement
by the Secretary of Labor as follows:
Whenever it shall appear that any person has violated or is about to violate any of the
provisions of this subchapter, the Secretary may bring a dvil action for such relief
(including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such action may be brought in
the District Court of the United States where the violation occurred or, at the option
of the parties, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Ibid.
9 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964). This section provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal
taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable
as such.
Ibid.
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GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
section 203(b) and (c) of the LMRDA. On cross motions for summary

judgment, 10 the district court"1 held that appellee's labor practice, other
than the three speeches, was exempt by section 203(c) from the reporting
requirements of section 203(b). On appeal, held, vacated and remanded.
An attorney engaging in a reportable activity under section 203(b) of the
LMRDA loses his section 203(c) exemption and must report receipts and
disbursements from all labor relations advice or services given during that
year. Douglas v. Wirtz, 853 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
909 (1966).

Section 203 of the LMRDA proscribes the undisclosed and improper labor
consultant 2 activities's which typically arise in connection with National
Labor Relations Board elections. 14 Section 203(b) requires that a person 1
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(b) (1964). This section provides:
(a) . . . A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days
from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) . . . A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
Ibid.
11 Douglas v. Wirtz, 232 F. Supp. 348 (M.D.N.C. 1964).
12 29 U.S.C. § 402(m) (1964). This section defines a labor relations consultant as:
[A]ny person who, for compensation, advises or represents an employer, employer
organization, or labor organization concerning employee organizing, concerted activities, or collective bargaining activities.
Ibid.
18 The reporting requirements of the Act are primarily designed to correct the abuses
in labor and management which were uncovered by the Select Committe on Improper
Activities in the Labor and Management Field, known as the McClellan Committee. See
Aaron, supra note 2, at 852. The Congressional declaration of findings, purposes, and policy
states:
The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the labor and management
fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust, corruption,
disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures to observe high
standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which require further and supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection of the rights and interests of
employees and the public generally as they relate to the activities of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants and their officers and representatives.

29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1964).
14 Often, prior to union elections, employers will hire a consultant or attorney to make
speeches to employees pointing out the "evils" of unions. See cases cited in notes 22 and
23 infra.
15 29 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1964). This section states that:
"Person" includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies,
trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.
Ibid.
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file reports16 ". .. of its receipts . . from . . labor relations advice or
services ... ,-17 if, pursuant to an agreement with an employer, he undertakes activities designed to persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise
their right to organize or bargain collectively.' 8 However section 203(c) exempts a person from filing reports if he engages exclusively in advisingt0
or representing an employer in specified formal proceedings or collective
bargaining. 20 Therefore, it is not clear whether the exemption provided by
section 203(c) is unqualified or is limited to years when no section 203(b)
persuasion activities are undertaken.2 1 Although one court indicated that
section 203(c) should provide an absolute exemption for the activities
enumerated in that section,2 2 the only court which has directly considered
16 These reports are set out in notes 5 and 6 supra.

29 U.S.C. § 433(b)(A) (1964); see note 6 supra.
See note 3 spra.
19 See Lang, Reporting Requirements In General,Svtt,osmM oN LMRDA 369 (Slovenko
ed. 1961). The author states:
Incidentally, the word "advice" in section 203(c) could include such matters as suggestions as to strategy in bargaining and in union organizing activity, personnel policy
and practice changes, preparation of speeches, circulars and letters to employees.
morale and other personal surveys, job incentives and evaluation studies and plans,
or anything connected with counseling in a personnel or labor relations program.
Id. at 376. In commenting on the types of expenditures which should be reported, Professor Archibald Cox made the following statement to the Senate Labor Committee
regarding "advice":
Second, any payment made by an employer to an independent firm to have it influence
or affect employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act, or to have it obtain information about how the employees are exercising
those rights, seems to me to be exceedingly questionable. I am not now talking about
payments for advice, following which the employer himself takes some action which
may influence employees, but if he goes to an outside consultant, an independent
person not connected with him, and then pays that person to influence employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act, there is
certainly very great reason to ask questions about why he resorted to this form of
transaction.
Beaird, supra note 2 at 293. This was reprinted from Hearings on Labor.Management
Reform Legislation Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1959).
20 See 29 U.S.C. § 433(c) (1964).
21 See Loomis, Employer and Consultant Reporting Requirements, Sv'rOSIU3t ON
LMRDA 391 (Slovenko ed. 1961). The author states:
Another related but unanswered question in this area is whether a consultant who
enters into a reportable agreement with only one employer, but who also performs
non-reportable services for other employers, must include in his annual report only
those receipts arising from the covered agreement, or also receipts arising from services
for the other employers which need not be reported initially.
Id. at 398. See Smith, supra note 2, at 220.
22 See Fowler v. Wirtz, 236 F. Supp. 22 (D. Fla. 1964) (dictum), appeal docketed Civil
No. 22350, 5th Cir., Nov., 1964. The district court held, in essence, that appeUees had no
duty to report their persuasive activities because they purported to act as attorneys while
they performed these activities and thus were exempt under §§ 203(c) and 204. The
17
18
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the question has held that, once a person engages in a section 203(b) reportable activity, he loses his section 203(c) exemption and must report
receipts and disbursements from his entire labor law practice for that fiscal
year.23
By construing section 203 of the LMRDA to require a full reporting of
all labor relations activities whenever a section 203(b) reportable activity
is undertaken, the instant court has given an interpretation which legislative history indicates best effectuates the intent of Congress. Congress thought
the activities which require a report under section 203(b)24 to be particularly
susceptible to dishonest labor practices.2 5 Moreover, as evidenced by its
references to consultants as "management middlemen," 20 Congress was
holding of the case appears to be clearly erroneous as such an interpretation of the statute
would give an absolute exemption to all attorneys and thus completely defeat the obvious
purpose of the act. The case is now pending on appeal in the Fifth Circuit. The questions
presented in the instant case were not reached by the court which noted that it was unnecessary to rule on the subsidiary points of whether the reports, if due, should Include
all labor relations advice or services or only those reportable under § 203(b). Nevertheless,
the court stated:
Defendant Secretary takes the position that if plaintiffs shall take one action with
respect to one client which is reportable then all services with respect to all clients
during that year are reportable in the annual report, even though all such activities
with respect to all other clients clearly fall within the terms of section 203(c) of the
Act even as interpreted by Defendant Secretary. To say the least, this interpretation
plays havoc with the obvious purpose of section 203(c) (as well as section 204) to protect
the attorney-client relationship from disclosure within the enumerated categories.
Id. at 84, n.4.
23 Price v. Wirtz, 58 L.R.R.M. 2607 (N.D. Tex. 1965) (memorandum decision), appeal
docketed, No. 22630, 5th Cir., April 6, 1965. As in the instant case, plaintiffs in Price
stipulated that their activities came within the provisions of § 203(b), but brought action
for a declaratory judgment holding erroneous the Secretary's interpretation of the scope
of reporting required in the annual report. The Secretary counterclaimed seeking an
order to compel plaintiffs to file an annual report containing a statement of receipts and
disbursements of any kind received from or expended on behalf of all employers on
account of labor relations advice or services in accordance with the regulations of the
Secretary. See Memorandum of Defendant in Support of Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, pp. 1-3, Price v. Wirtz, supra. The district court denied relief to the plaintiffs
and granted the counterclaim of the Secretary.
24 See 29 U.S.C. § 433(b) (1964).
25 Congress' impression on this was made clear by the following Senate Committee
statement:
All of the activities required to be reported by this section [203(b)] are not Illegal
nor are they unfair labor practices. However, since most of them are disruptive of
harmonious labor relations and fall into a gray area, the committee believes that If
an employer or a consultant indulges in them, they should be reported ....
S. Ra P. No. 187, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1959); reprinted in 1 L.oIsLwrivE Hsrony or Tnm
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DiscLosuRE ACT or 1959, at 408 (1959).
26 Congress' attitude toward "management middlemen" is clarified by the following
statement:
The committee notes that in almost every instance of corruption in the labor-
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aware of the duplicitious posture frequently assumed by consultants acting
as intermediaries and realized that full disclosure of receipts and disbursements would inform the employees of any conflict of interests of the intermediary,27 Furthermore, legislative history dearly indicates that section
203(c) was meant as an exemption only for those who confine themselves to
advising and normal representative activities.2 8 Thus, there is sound support
for the view that Congress intended that participation in a single 203(b)
reportable activity should require full disclosure of all labor relations
activities.
management field there have been direct or indirect management involvements. The
report of the McClellan Committee describes management middlemen flitting about
the country on behalf of employers to defeat attempts at labor organization. In some
cases they work directly on employees or through committees to discourage legitimate
organizational drives or set up company-dominated unions. These middlemen have
been known to negotiate sveetheart contracts. They have been involved in bribery
and corruption as well as unfair labor practices The middlemen have acted, in fact
if not in law, as agents of management ....
S. Ri,. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1959); reprinted in 1 LEGtstATnv HsroaY or mu
LABoR-MANAGEmENTr REPORTNG AND Dtscmosum Acr OF 1959, at 405 (1959).
27 That one of the objectives of the reporting requirements was discoure of

such

conflicts of interest is substantiated by the following.
The bill is intended to prevent, discourage, and make unprofitable improper conduct
on the part of union officials, employers, and their representatives by required reporting of certain arrangements, actions, and interests. In some instances matters to be
reported are not illegal and may not be improper but may serve to disclose conflicts
of interest. Even in such instances disclosure will enable the persons whose rights are
affected, the public, and the Government, to determine whether the arrangements or
activities are justifiable, ethical, and legal.
1. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1959); reprinted in 1 LEGsLmATnvE HtsroaY oF Tie
I.ABoR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AD DiscLosua Acr or 1959, at 762 (1959). Disclosure is
made possible by section 205 of the LMRDA which provides that the Secretary of Labor

may publish "any information and data which he obtains pursuant to the provisions of
this subsection." 29 U.S.C. § 435(a) (1964).
28 This interpretation is substantiated by the following Senate Committee statement
made during the term of the passage of the legislation:
An attorney or consultant who confines himself to giving legal advice, taking part in
collective bargaining and appearing in court or administrative proceedings would not
be included among those required to file reports under this subsection [b] ....
S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1959); reprinted in 1 LEmsATnvE HLsroay oF ma
LABOR-MANAGEmENT REPORMG AND DIsCLOsuR

Acr OF 1959, at 408 (1959). (Emphasis

added.)
The same report states further:
The committee did not intend to have the reporting requirements of the bill apply
to attorneys and labor relations consultants who perform an important and useful
function in contemporary labor relations and do not engage in actiuities of the types
listed in section 103(b).
S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1959); reprinted in I LEGSATIE HisrORY OFruz
LABOR-MANAGEMENT

REORTING AND DISCLOsuRE Ac

OF 1959, at 436 (1959).

(Emphasis

added.)
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Although there may appear to be some ambiguity in the language of the
statute, a dose analysis provides a logical contruction. Section 203(b)(A)
provides that an annual report must include a statement "of its receipts of
any kind from employers on account of labor relations advice or services .... ." However, section 203(c) states that "Nothing contained in this
section shall be construed to require any employer or other person to file a
report covering the services of such person by reason of" activities enumerated in section 203(c) such as giving advice to employers. This is simply
a statement that the filing of a report under section 203(b) is not required
"by reason of" the enumerated activities, and not a statement that the
activities, as such, are exempted from the reporting requirements entirely.
Therefore, since section 208(b) expressly includes advice in the reporting
requirement, to construe section 203(c) as completely excluding advice
would read an inconsistency into these sections. Thus, a logical application
of the two sections would require no report if a person engages solely in
giving advice to employers, but a full report of all labor relations activities,
including advice to employers, if a person engages in employee persuasion
29
or any other 203(b) activity.
Finally, several objections have arisen to the broad 0 interpretation given
See Bernstein & Sullivan, Lawyer Reporting and the Attorney Client Privilege,
ON LMRDA 410 (Slovenko ed. 1961). The authors are in accord with the
statutory interpretation of the immediate case:
[I]t must be recalled that once a person is engaged to undertake a single reportable
activity not exempted under section 203(c), he must file an annual report in addition
to the current report. This annual report must be filed for any fiscal year in which
payments were made pursuant to an undertaking which required the filing of a current report. It must include a statement of "receipts of any kind from employers on
account of labor relation advice or services, designating the sources thereof," and a
statement of "disbursements of any kind in connection with such services, and the
purposes thereof." Thus the person (consultant or lawyer) is literally required to
disclose his entire labor practice as the consequence of engaging in a single reportable
transaction. This was not a legislative inadvertence. It was and is the expressed
Congressional intent to require full reporting once it is established that a lawyer
or consultant is the "middleman" business.
Id. at 414-15.
20 It has been argued that the LMRDA is a criminal statute and should be strictly
construed. See Brief for Appellee, pp. 8-9, Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1965).
However, this argument has been rejected and the LMRDA has been found to be
remedial in nature. See Postma v. Teamsters Local 294, 56 L.R.R.M. 2255 (N.D.N.Y. 1964).
The court stated:
With the background of the purpose of the statute in mind, it would seem Inescapable
that the resulting legislation is principally remedial in its nature and must be applied
in a manner to effectuate its purpose "in the light of the mischief to be corrected and
the end to be attained." Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 at 153 [sic].
Id. at 2257; see Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer and Co., 349 U.S. 427, 429 (1955) (remedial
statutes are to be liberally construed); A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (1945)
(exemptions from remedial statutes are to be narrowly construed).
29

SYMPOSIUM
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section 203 by the instant court. First, it has been suggested that the reporting requirements violate the fifth amendment. 3 ' However, it has been held
that records required by law to be kept on transactions subject to governmental regulations are not private, but quasi-public records, and therefore
are not covered by the privilege against self-incrimination. 32 Furthermore,
the policy expressed in section 203(b) is analogous to the policy behind
31 No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law ....
U.S. CONSr. amend. V. This problem is based on the fact that §§ 203(a) and 0b) of the
LMRDA require employers and middlemen to report payments which may also constitute
a criminal act under § 302 of Taft-Hartley, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1964). For a discussion of the
merits of this argument see notes 32 and 33 infra.
The constitutionality of the LMRDA is also questioned on the basis that Congress has
legislated with respect to purely local matters. See Goldberg v. Truck Drivers Union, 293
F.2d 807 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938 (1961). The court met this argument in the
following manner.
Where, as here, the activities have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, it is
not an objection that they are local in character. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 ... ; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 ....
The Commerce Clause does not inhibit Congress in selecting the means deemed
necessary for bringing out the desired conditions in the channels of interstate commerce. American Power and Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 100 ....
In our opinion, Section 201 of the act does not offend against the Commerce
Clause.
Id. at 815-16. For a discussion of the constitutional questions raised by the LMRDA see
generally Fisher, Constitutional Questions Under the Neo Act, 48 GEo. L.J. 209 (1959).
An objection based on the first amendment has been raised regarding the employer
reporting provisions, but no such objection has been made regarding the consultant reporting requirements. See Beaird, supra note 2, at 283-90. In any case, it appears that
the constitutionality of the act would be upheld as a legitimate exercise of the power of
Congress. See note 33 infra.
32 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. I (1947); United States v. Darby. 312 U.S. 100
(1941) (record keeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Rodgers v. United
States, 138 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1943) (defendant refused to file reports required under
Agricultural Adjustment Act); Bowles v. Amato, 60 F. Supp. 361 (D. Colo. 1945), afj'd sub
nom. Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 812 (1946)
(records kept pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act). The Court in Shapiro
elaborated on the "required records" doctrine in determining the constitutionality of the
Emergency Price Control Act. The court stated:
It may be assumed at the outset that there are limits which the Government cannot
constitutionally exceed in requiring the keeping of records which may be inspected
by an administrative agency and may be used in prosecuting statutory violations committed by the record-keeper himself. But no serious misgiving that these bounds have
been overstepped would appear to be evoked where there is a suflicient relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the public concern so that the Government can constitutionally regulate or forbid the basic activity concerned, and can
constitutionally require the keeping of particular records subject to inspection by the
administrator.
Shapiro v. United States, supra at 32.
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the disclosure provisions of the Federal Lobbying Act, 88 enacted to enable
objective evaluation of the pressures used to influence a congressman. The
employee contemplating union affiliation has an analogous interest in
being informed of the true nature of the pressures being applied to him.
Second, the objection is made that the reporting requirements will result
in a violation of the attorney-client privilege.8 4 However this objection appears to be based on the incorrect premise that the reports disclose information otherwise within the scope of the privilege. Section 203(b) reports
require only the name of the consultant and his employer, the amount of
receipts and disbursements made, and the terms of the agreement-facts
which are not protected by the privilege.35 Third, it has been argued that
83 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1964). The constitutionality of the disclosure provisions of this act
has been upheld as a legitimate exercise of the power of Congress. United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
84 See Fowler v. Wirtz, 236 F. Supp. 22, 31-32 (D. Fla. 1964); Brief for Appellee, pp.
30-34, Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965); note 36 infra.
35 See In Re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 17-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), af'd sub nom. Colton v.
United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1968) (general
description of legal services not within privilege); In Re Wasserman, 198 F. Supp. 564,
566-67 (D.D.C. 1961) (fact of employment and amount of fees not within privilege);
Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D. Mass. 1958) (performance of certain services
by attorney not within privilege); MCCOaMICa, EVIDENCE § 94 (1954). Professor McCormick
states:

The weight of authority denies the privilege for the fact of consultation or employment, including the component facts of the identity of the client, such Identifying facts
about him as his address and occupation, the identity of the lawyer, and the scope
of or object of the employment.
Id. at 189.
It has been argued that section 204 of the LMRDA excludes all activities occurring in
performance of the normal attorney-client relationship. See Fowler v. Wirtz, 286 F. Supp.
22, 30-31 (D. Fla. 1964). Section 204 provides:
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to require an attorney who Is a
member in good standing of the bar of any State, to include in any report required
to be filed pursuant to the provisions of this Act any information which was lawfully
communicated to such attorney by any of his clients in the course of a legitimate
attorney-client relationship.
29 U.S.C. § 434 (1964). This section, however, excludes only communications made by
the client to the attorney, and this information is not required by the reports. The
Secretary of Labor has taken the position that section 204 merely enacts a statutory
attorney-client exemption as to a specific type of information. It does not restrict or
enlarge the common law privilege. See Memorandum of Defendant in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 11 n.5, Douglas v. Wirtz, 232 F. Supp. 348 (M.D.N.C. 1964).
Some commentators have found this section to be virtually meaningless. See Bernstein &
Sullivan, note 29 supra.
The legislative history of section 204 lends credence to the argument that it was
intended to be more than an exercise in semantic futility. At the same time, any
such construction clearly will have to be compounded to a large extent out of
wishful thinking.
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a broad interpretation will place an undue reporting burden on labor
attorneys. 6 Nevertheless, to give the intended effect to section 203(b) and
(c), courts must accept the legislative finding that responsible consultants
and attorneys do not engage in the type of activities enumerated in section 203(b).3 7 When an attorney decides to engage in these activities he
must simply balance the benefits with the obligations incident to the
undertaking.

Evidence-HEARSAY-A WrrNFss' PRIOR WRITMN STATnmENT NOT MADE
UNDER OATH is Amu~ssrB.E As SUBSTANTrVE EvIDF c-The defendant and
one Bregman were indicted for the removal and concealment of property
with intent to evade and defeat the collection of taxes, a violation of 26
U.S.C. section 7206.1 At the first trial Bregman was convicted, but the jury

was unable to reach a verdict as to the defendant.2 At the defendanes second

trial the Government called Bregman as a witness. He was evasive, unresponsive and contradictory when testifying about the events leading up to
the concealment of the property. The Government then introduced, as
substantive evidence, a signed statement which Bregman had submitted to
the judge one day prior to sentencing for his conviction in the first trial.;
Id. at 416. In the instant case it was stipulated that § 204 had no
for Appellant, p. 6, Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965).
36

application. See Brief

See Brief for Appellee, pp. 26-30. Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965);

note 37 infra.
37 Congress' view on attorneys who undertake § 203(b) activities is tarified by the
following statement:

Since attorneys at law and other responsible labor relation advisers do not themsrelues
engage in influencing or affecting employees in the exercise of their rights under the
National Labor Relations Act, an attorney or other consultant who confined himself
to giving advice, taking part in collective bargaining and appearing in court and
administrative proceedings nor [sic] would such a consultant be required to report.
S. REP,. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1958) (Emphasis added.).
I This section provides, in part, that:
Any person who . . .
(4) Removes, deposits, or conceals, or is concerned in removing, depositing.
or concealing, any goods or commodities for or in respect whereof any tax
is or shall be imposed, or any property upon which levy is authorized by section 6331, with intent to evade or defeat the assessment or collection of any
tax imposed by this title ...
shall be guilty of a felony ....
26 U.S.C. § 7206 (1964).
2 See United States v. Bregman, 306 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
906 (1963), for the Third Circuit's opinion alffrming Bregman's conviction.
3 The witness Bregman conceded he had made the statement with the assistance of
an attorney. United States v. Schwartz, 252 F. Supp. 866, 868 (EMD. Pa. 1966). In essence,
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On post trial motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, held,
denied. A witness' prior signed statement not made under oath is admissible as substantive evidence where the witness is unresponsive and the
prior statement is trustworthy. United States v. Schwartz, 252 F. Supp. 866
(E.D. Pa. 1966).
Prior inconsistent statements are admissible in evidence to impeach an
adversary's witness after a proper foundation is laid.4 But such evidence is
generally not admitted to impeach the testimony of one's own witness.0
However, this rule is not applicable when an adversary is surprised by his
own witness' testimony, 6 and this testimony has prejudiced the calling
the statement said the defendant had directed the concealment and that he, Bregman,
was not guilty of any wrong.
4 Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry. v. Artery, 137 U.S. 507, 519 (1890); Lee Dong Sep v.
Dulles, 220 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955). The theory of impeachment by such statements Is

not that the prior inconsistent statement is true and the present testimony false, but
rather that the witness is in general capable of making errors in his present testimony.
3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1017 (3d ed. 1940). Professor McCormick would confine the
theory of this impeachment to raising doubts only as to both statements. McCoRMIcK,
EVIDENCE

§ 34 (1954). As a practical matter it makes little difference because the jury

will attach the weight it deems necessary to the inconsistency in determining the

credibility of the witness.
Before a court will allow such evidence for impeachment purposes, it must be shown

that there is a genuine inconsistency between the prior statement and the present
testimony, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 104 Ga. App. 554, 122 S.E.2d 268 (1961), and

that the inconsistent statements pertain to a matter material to the substantive issues
of the case, United States v. Klass, 166 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1948).
See generally Orfield, Impeachment and Support of Witnesses in Federal Criminal
Cases, 11 KAN. L. REV. 447 (1963).
5 Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. (U.S.) 412, 440 (1836). The origin of this rule is in doubt,
but it is believed to have its root in the medieval trial by compurgation. Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1936). The
historical reasons for such a rule are threefold: (1) a party is morally bound by the
statements of his own witness, (2) a party guarantees his witness' credibility, and (3) a
party should not have the means to coerce his own witness. 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra
note 4, §§ 897-99. It is generally agreed by the textwriters that it is the third factor
which furnishes the only valid reason for supporting the rule today. See 8 WIGNoRo,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 899. However, even this reason has been attacked. Ladd, supra
at 81.
If a calling party is obliged to call an adverse party as a witness, impeachment is allowed under Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, there is no
companion provision for such impeachment in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This omission has been criticized on the ground that it deprives the accused
of a proper means in ascertaining the truth. United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 958 (1963).
6 Wheeler v. United States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019
(1954); United States v. Maggio, 126 F.2d 155 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 686 (1942).
The degree of surprise required before a party can impeach his own witness has been
categorized as genuine and legal surprise. Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 VA. L.
REV. 996, 1002 (1963). However, as a practical matter, the determination of surprise is cor-
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party's case.7 Nevertheless, according to the orthodox rule, such prior inconsistent statements may not be used as substantive evidence because
they are deemed to be hearsay.8 For example, prior statements read to one's
rectly placed within the discretion of the trial court and such discretion will not be disturbed unless it plainly appears that the ruling is without any rational basis. See Wheeler
v. United States, supra at 25. But the doctrine permitting impeachment of one's own
witness under circumstances of surprise cannot be used as a vehicle for the admission
of evidence otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rule. Young v. United States, 97
F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938); Kuhn v. United States, 24 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1928).
7 United States v. Maggio, 126 F.2d 155, 158-59 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 US. 686
(1942); People v. Newson, 37 Cal. 2d 34, 41, 230 P.2d 618, 622 (1951). The prejudice to the
calling party's case must be real, i.e., the prior statement must contradict the present testimony; mere forgetfulness by the witness is not sufficient. E.g., Webb v. Commonwealth,
314 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. 1958). See Note, supra note 6, at 1004-07, where the %riter discusses
at length the court's construction of a California statute relating to impeachment of one's
own witness. See generally Ladd, supra note 5.
8 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 150-55 (1945). In this case the defendant appeared
at a deportation hearing before an inspector designated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. At the hearing, the Government called a witness who testified contrary to his prior unsigned, unsworn statement. The inspector admitted the statement
and the Board of Immigration Appeals used the statement as substantive evidence
in ordering the defendant deported. The Supreme Court held that since the statement
was hearsay, and repugnant to the due process clause, it could be used only for impeachment purposes, not as substantive evidence; to hold otherwise, "... would allow
men to be convicted on unsworn testimony of witnesses-a practice which runs counter
to the notions of fairness on which our legal system is founded." 326 US. at 153-54.
See United States ex Yel. Ng Kee Wong v. Corsi, 65 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1933) (prior
statement used as substantive evidence in alien exclusion hearing).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bridges, there were indications that two
federal appellate courts desired to discard this traditional rule. Judge Learned Hand.
in DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 706 (1925),
found no danger in allowing the jury to consider a prior statement as affirmative evidence saying.
If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now
is not the truth, but what he said before, they are none the less deciding from
what they see and hear of that person and in court. There is no mythical necessity
that the case must be decided only in accordance with the truth of words uttered
under oath in court.
Id. at 368. But later the learned jurist admitted that the courts were not free to change
the law and allow a conviction based upon unsworn evidence. United States V. Block.
88 F.2d 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 690 (1937). But see United States v. Graham,
102 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1939). The Eighth Circuit, in Chicago, St. P., IM.& 0. Ry. v. Kulp,
102 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 636 (1939), stated that the circumstances
of the case warranted giving some weight to the prior statements but recanted and followed the orthodox rule. The court affirmed its adherence to the orthodox rule in a
later criminal trial. Ellis v. United States, 138 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1943). The Third
Circuit also adheres to the traditional rule. Romer v. Baldwin, 317 F.2d 919 (3d Cir.
1963). However, this rule has been severely criticized, although followed, by the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. United States v. Biener, 52 F. Supp. 54
(E.D. Pa. 1943). See also Pelham v. Hendricks, 132 F. Supp. 774 (M.D. Pa. 1955) (reliance on state law in adoption of traditional rule).
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own witness in an attempt to refresh his recollection are not to be treated
as affirmative evidence. 9 Furthermore, if a prior statement is introduced to
impeach a witness, it is ground for reversal if its use as substantive evidence is apparent. 10 But, if the witness adopts the prior written statement
as the truth, it may be received as substantive evidence even though the oral
testimony contradicts the written statement.11 Moreover, several state courts
have allowed the use of a witness' prior inconsistent statement as affirmative evidence even though it is repugnant to the orthodox hearsay rule. 12
See generally Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HARV. L. REv. 177, 192-96 (1948).
9 E.g., United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 247 F. Supp. 481, 498 (D. Md.
1965). If the calling party is not allowed to impeach his own witness, he may still
question him about the prior statement under the guise of refreshing his memory.
See Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303 (1894). And, if the witness concedes that
the prior statement is true and his present testimony in error, the prior statement may
be used as substantive evidence. See note 11 infra.
10 Rashaw v. Central Vt. Ry., 133 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1943): United States v. ]3iener,
52 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa. 1943); Smith v. Pelz, 384 Ill.
446, 51 N.E.2d 534 (1943). In
Rashaw, an attorney removed himself from the case to testify about a witness' prior
statement. The testimony given constituted the calling party's only evidence on a point
essential to that party's case. The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision
saying, "the case was submitted to the jury upon allegations of negligence some of
which were not supported by any substantial evidence whatever." Rashaw v. Central
Vt. Ry., supra at 256. It would seem that for an appellate court to make such a decision, it must appear that there is no other evidence presented from which the jury
could make such a finding. Thus, although a jury may well reach a finding based
solely upon impeachment evidence, generally its detection will be made only In this
particular situation. However, if the court feels that the hearsay evidence is so firmly
planted in the jury's mind, and the prejudice caused cannot be mended by any instructions that may be given by the trial judge, it may be grounds for reversal. United
States v. Block, 88 F.2d 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 690 (1937).
11 Zimberg v. United States, 142 F.2d 132 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 712 (1944);
Stewart v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 137 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1943). In this situation, the jury
is not directed to find the prior written statement as fact, but rather it is entitled to
base its finding on either of the conflicting parcels of evidence. McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEXAs L. REv. 573, 575
(1947).
12 Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 315-20, 85 S.W.2d 400, 409-12 (1935). See State
v. Jolly, 112 Mont. 352, 116 P.2d 686 (1941). In Pulitzer, the court held a prior inconsistent sworn statement made by a witness in a deposition in the same case admissible
as substantive proof of the facts stated. However, the same court refused to apply a
similar rationale in a criminal trial where the witness had made inconsistent statements
before a grand jury and several grand jurors testified to the fact. State v. Davenport,
342 Mo. 996, 119 S.W.2d 291 (1938). Although in Pultizer the witness was confronted
with the prior deposition and in Davenport other parties testified to the witness' prior
statements, the only real distinction seems to be that the former was a civil case while
the latter was a criminal case. However, the Missouri Supreme Court has since limited
the rule in Pulitzer to the facts in that case. Hammond v. Schuermann, 352 Mo. 418,
177 S.W.2d 618 (1944).
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Similarly, one federal court has allowed the use of such evidence where the
witness' prior statement was made several days after the event and was
further corroborated by similar testimony before a grand jury and in a
prior trial1h
Hearsay evidence is traditionally defined as testimony in court or written
evidence of a statement made out of court which is offered to show the
truth of the matter asserted, and which rests on the credibility of the out-ofcourt assertor 1 4 If the evidence offered is a prior written statement, the
In State v. Jolly, supra, evidence was introduced to impeach a witness' testimony.
The trial judge failed to instruct the jury that such evidence could not be used as
affirmative evidence, however, the defendant failed to object to this omission. The
Supreme Court of Montana, while recognizing that Wigmore's views seem to be supported by the better reasoning, held that the defendant cannot assign error when he
has failed to correct the court's omission. See also Batcholf v. Craney, 119 Mont. 157,
172 P. 2d 308 (1946) (court adopts orthodox view in a civil case).
See McCormick, supra note 11, one of the classic works on the subject of prior statements as affirmative evidence, where the author suggests a rule more advanced than
the present law but not as radical as Professor igmore's views.
3 United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 US. 979 (1964).
This decision, authored by Judge Friendly, represents the first true departure in the
federal courts from the orthodox rule that a witness' prior statements may not be admitted as substantive evidence unless they come within a specific exception to the hearsay rule. In this case, the Government's principal witness positively identified the defendant on direct examination, however, he expressed doubts as to this identification
on cross-examination. In an attempt to repair the damage on redirect, the Government
had the witness testify that he had selected the defendant from a police line-up and
had sworn to his identity before a grand jury and at an earlier trial. Over the defendant's objection, the court refused to instruct the jury that this evidence could be
considered only as bearing on the witness' credibility. Several days later. the judge
included in his charge to the jury the general instruction that a prior inconsistent
statement by a witness, not made under oath, is not to be considered as affirmative
proof but may be considered only to impeach the witness' testimony.
Since the decision in De Sisto, two other circuits have considered this new doctrine.
Both have rejected it with little discussion of the matter. Byrd v. United States, 342
F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Crowder, 346 F.2d I (6th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 909 (1965). Further, the Second Circuit itself appears to have some
doubts about the correctness of its decision. Although the Court has said that Dc Sito
is still the law in the Second Circuit, United States v. Persico, 349 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.
1965), this new rule has been avoided. See United States v. Casteilana, 349 F.2d 264,
276 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1966). Thus, it seems that the Second
Circuit, at least for the present, has decided to confine the rule to the facts in the
case. Perhaps more important, however, is the dictum in Taylor v. Baltimore & 0. R.R.,
344 F.2d 281 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 US. 831 (1965), where the court said:
At the last term we followed [the] view of upholding the reception as substantive
evidence of inconsistent testimony of the witness at a former trial and before a
grand jury. ... We went no further because we entertained doubts . .. both as to
whether we could, see Bridges v. Wixon . . . and as to whether, having in mind
the ease of putting thoughts into the minds of prospective witnesses, we should.
Id. at 283.
1- McCoRmc,, op. cit. supra note 4, § 225. The scholars themselves are in conflict as
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orthodox hearsay rule usually excludes such evidence to prove the matter

asserted because the statement was not made under oath' 5 and it was
made without confrontation or an opportunity for cross-examination by
the opposing party.16 As such, the court in the instant case departed from
the orthodox rule by allowing a witness' prior unsworn statement to be
admitted as substantive evidence.
Until recently, it was believed that the Supreme Court's decision in
Bridges v. Wixon 17 forbade any departure from the orthodox hearsay rule.
In that case the Court held that a prior unsworn statement could not be
admitted as substantive evidence since it was hearsay and to admit it would
violate due process. However in 1964, the Second Circuit, in United States
v. De Sisto,'8 did depart from the orthodox rule, 19 although shortly there-

after the same court expressed concern that its decision ran counter to the
20
holding in Bridges.

Although similar concern may be expressed regarding the ruling in the
instant case, the Bridges ruling is distinguishable. In Bridges, the prior
to what constitutes hearsay. For example, Professor Wigmore defines hearsay as an
extrajudicial statement which is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 1361-62. Rule 63 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
confines hearsay to evidence of a statement made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing which is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
15 MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 4, § 224. Professor Wigmore contends that the
requirement of an oath merely means the declarant be subject to cross-examination
under oath. 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1362. This requirement is never stressed
and is thought to be incidental to the requirement of cross-examination. See Morgan,
Foreword to MODEL CODE OF Evi.NxcE at 36-37 (1942).
16 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1362; McCoRmIcK, op. cit. supra note 4, § 224.
It cannot be doubted that when A testified to what B said out of court, and B is not
present and subject to cross-examination, this testimony should not be admitted as
substantive evidence. But when the declarant is subject to confrontation and crossexamination by the opposing party, the reason for the rule becomes absurd. 3 WIGtoRm, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1018. In the instant ruling, the declarant was present
at the trial and subject to cross-examination which would have brought to light the
op. cit. supra note 4, § 1018. From this
basis for the prior statement. See 3 WioRao,
cross-examination, the jurors, "as normal human beings, capable of evaluating relevant
material in a courtroom as well as in the ordinary affairs of life," Morgan, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 48, could place the weight deemed adequate on the prior statement, keeping
in mind the expert assistance given them by the trial judge. See United States v.
Schwartz, 252 F. Supp. 866, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
17 326 U.S. 135 (1945). See note 8 supra.
18 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
19 While the rule in De Sisto departed from the orthodox rule, the instant case goes
much further. In De Sisto the witness identified the defendant several days after the
event and testified under oath to this identification in subsequent grand jury proceedings and a criminal trial. In the instant ruling the statement was not made until
seven years after the event and was not made under oath.
20 See Taylor v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 344 F.2d 281 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
831 (1965). See note 13 supra.
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statement was made to investigating officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and was neither sworn to nor signed by the witness.
Moreover, the witness denied having made the statement. In the instant
case the witness signed and submitted the statement under an air of
solemnity much greater than that in Bridges. Perhaps most important, he
testified at the trial that he had made the prior statement. 2 '
The instant court's decision should also be considered against the backdrop of the Model Code of Evidence23 and the writings of Professors Wigmore23 and Morgan. 24 These authorities advocate a liberal rule that would
readily allow the admission of prior inconsistent statements as substantive
evidence. For example, the Model Code provides that "evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the delarant... (b) is
present and subject to cross-examination." 2 5 Thus, the Code follows the
view that if the declarant is in court and subject to cross-examination, there
is no real basis for a hearsay objection. The absence of any requirement in
the Model Code that the prior statement have a high degree of trustworthiness apparently has led to the refusal by courts to accept its analysis.
While there are guarantees of trustworthiness, e.g., the signing of the
prior statement by the witness, 2 6 present in the instant case which distinguish it from the liberality of the Model Code's position, the guarantees
are not of the traditional type which have directly led to accepted hearsay
rule exceptions.2 7 The importance of the Schwartz decision is its recognition
that guarantees other than those provided by the oath may be used to
establish the trustworthiness of an out-of-court statement. When these
guarantees have been demonstrated to the court, then the trustworthiness
of the statement more properly involves a question of weight rather than
admissibility. Thus, when a witness has conveniently forgotten an essential
aspect of the calling party's case, a prior statement, reasonably shown to
21 See United States v. Schwartz, 252 F. Supp. 866 r.3 (E.D. Pa. 1966), where the trial
judge felt the jury should not be permitted to find that the witness adopted the statement.
22 MODEL CODE OF EvmENtc rule 503(b) (1942).
23 See 3 WVIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1018.

24 Morgan, supra note 8, at 192-96, 218-19.
25 MODEL CODE OF EvIENCE, supra note 22. The Uniform Rules of Evidence adopts
a middle-of-the-road approach in excluding hearsay evidence. Rule 63 excludes all statements made other than by a witness while testifying which is offered to prove the
truth of the matter stated unless such statements fall within stated exceptions. The
exceptions provided generally follow those accepted at common law.
26 See note 3 supra. The court assumed that the witness was aware of the penalty
for submitting a false statement to the Government under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964). See
United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955).
27 Professor Wigmore states that the exceptions to the hearsay rule have evolved because, (1) there is a necessity for receiving the evidence, and (2) there is a circumstantial
probability of its being trustworthy. 5 VsoNOaR, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 1420-22.
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be trustworthy, could be introduced as substantive evidence and weighed
by the jury in light of the witness' present testimony.
Although the standards of trustworthiness required for admission of a
prior statement as substantive evidence were redefined in Schwartz, it
appears clear that trustworthiness itself is still a factor to be considered by
the court. However the court in Schwartz has presented a more flexible
standard. Hence, if the courts accept the rationale of the instant ruling,
they would still not be taking "the big step forward" to acceptance of the
Model Code's hearsay rule.28 Nevertheless, they would be advancing toward
a more rational approach to the problem of admissibility of prior out-ofcourt statements.
28 Nor would they reach Professor McCormick's "halfway house on the road of
progress" where:
A statement made on a former occasion by a declarant having an opportunity to
observe the facts stated, will be received as evidence of such facts, notwithstanding
the rule against hearsay if
(1) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the declarant . . .
or the making of the statement is acknowledged by the declarant in his testimony
in the present proceeding, and
(2) the party against whom the statement is offered is afforded an opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant.
McCormick, supra note 11, at 588. Schwartz required more guarantees than merely a
written statement and the availability of the declarant for cross-examination.
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